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Abstract
Business information technology is traditionally viewed as information provision
technology. In this view, organizations use their IT to implement databases that pro-
vide people with information when they want it. This view is persistent even though
information provision is never an end in itself but always has the further purpose to
support the coordination of activities of people. The role of IT as coordination tech-
nology became more prominent in the 1980s with the advent of network technology,
that allowed activities across different businesses to be coordinated. This trend has
accellerated since the growth of Internet usage, and today IT is used to support an
increasingly varied range of processes performed by a variety of partners that do not
all have a hierarchical relation to each other. This makes it difficult to analyze re-
quirements for IT support and specify IT solutions: Business processes may not be
well-defined, and interests of different businesses may clash. This report argues that to
deal with this in requirements engineering and IT solution specification, business in-
formation technology should not be viewed as IT support for business processes but as
IT support for the coordination of activities in one or more businesses. We will identify
three basic coordination mechanisms, namely coordination by price, by management,
and by shared norms, and for each of these mechanisms, we will identify requirements
for IT support. The advent of flexible and standardized networking technology has
facilitated the creation of novel coordination mechanisms within these three general
paradigms, and we will give an inventory of generalized coordination mechanisms made
possible by current IT. Finally, we will draw conclusions for requirements engineering
methods for IT support for each of the coordination mechanisms identified by the
framework.
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1 Introduction
1.1 The problem
In the 1960 and 1970s, information technology (IT) was used by organizations, logically
enough, to provide people with information. To determine the requirements for IT support,
business processes were analyzed, information needs identified, and information systems
were specified that provide the information required at various places in the business pro-
cesses. Starting from the 1980s, business processes were also analyzed to identify process
support opportunities, and solutions in the form of workflow management or cooperative
work support were defined. It is not a coincidence that process support systems arose with
the advent of network technology: Business process support is always the coordination of
activities of different actors in a business, and these actors need to be connected in an IT
network in order to provide process support.
An important characteristic of the requirements engineering process in all these cases
is that it takes place within one business. In other words, there is, ultimately, one source
of authority to make design decisions: the business. Each business is a hierarchy with a
single highest point of authority to which other must report, and it is that highest point of
authority that in the end authorizes the decisions made in the business. There is a single
business mission, an overall strategy, shared business processes, problem-solving teams,
decision rules, etc.
Starting with Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) in the 1980s, computers where ad-
ditionally used to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of transactions across business
partners. This trend accelerated in the 1990s with the advent of e-commerce. Requirements
analysis for networked systems faces the problem that there is no single decision-making
authority for the system, and consequently, agreement on requirements may be hard to
reach. There is no overall strategy, partners in EDI only optimize with respect to their
own goals and not to any overall goal —assuming that there would be any—, there may
be ambiguous processes, there is no shared problem-solving structure, etc. As a result,
requirements negotiations may be interminable. This was already apparent in EDI systems
development, which is notorious for its interminable negotiations among participating busi-
nesses. And the demise of the e-commerce hype made visible that in networked business,
there is no magic either. One cannot translate a smart business idea into software and start
operating without working out a win-win situation for all actors involved, and this involves
negotiating an agreement with these partners.
To develop business information technology, we should drop the idea that this technology
is used for a single business process in one business and incorporate theories and techniques
that deal with multiple viewpoints and interests at the outset. However, the idea that
requirements originate from a hierarchy is still pervasive in current requirements engineering
methods. Textbooks in the area suggest that requirements are there to be elicitated [16],
that problems wait patiently to be analyzed [12], and that there is a zoo of specification
techniques to be used once requirements are found [35].
In this report we approach requirements engineering from a coordination point of view.
Coordination by management hierarchy is just one coordination mechanism, and we will
identify many more. Each of these coordination mechanisms imposes particular require-
ments on IT support, that we will analyze in this report.
We are concerned with the coordination of business activities. However, businesses
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consist of people and they have customers that may be other businesses or people; and
all people use software to accomplish tasks. Hence, the actors to be coordinated may be
businesses, people, or software. Coordination between businesses has important differences
with coordination between people, mainly of a legal nature, and these differences are relevant
for the use of information technology. However, here we will investigate common features
across all these different situations and draw conclusions from those common features about
the use of information technology.
1.2 Related work
In this report I combine ideas from several areas. I start from a distinction between trans-
actional and relational contracts that was introduced by Macneil [19, 20] in the 1970s in a
thorough analysis of legal contracts. I combine these ideas with the concept of coordination
introduced by Malone and Crowston [21] in the 1990s and apply them to the distinction
made in economic sociology by Ouchi in 1980 and by Powell in 1990 between communities
(called by various names, such as “clans” and “networks”) and markets [27, 29]. Com-
munities are relational structures coordinated by shared norms and values. Markets are
transactional structures coordinated by price. Management hierarchies are structures coor-
dinated by management authority [14].
I use the basic ideas from transaction cost economy introduced by Coase in 1937 [5]
and worked out by Williamson [37, 38] in the 1970s and 1980s to characterize differences
between the three basic coordination mechanisms of markets, hierachies and communities.
Finally, I use the analysis of outsourcing by Clemons, Reddi and Rows [4] to describe the
impact of IT on these basic coordination mechanisms. This leads to the classification of
coordination mechanisms presented in figure 3. This table is a hypothesis to be further
validated by analysis of empirical data.
The framework for coordination mechanisms is used to define a requirements engineering
approach that borrows elements from Jackson’s problem analysis [12] and my own systems
engineering approach [36]. The novelty of the approach described in this report lies in
the particular combination of ideas known from different areas and their application to
requirements engineering for IT support.
1.3 Structure of the report
In section 2, we approach the topic of coordination by defining two extreme coordination
mechanisms, namely coordination by relationships and coordination by transactions. These
are ideal types1 that do not occur in reality in pure form. Actual coordination mechanisms
are a mixture of these two.
In section 3, we analyze the different properties of these coordination mechanisms with
respect to planning and replanning of coordinated activities. We also introduce the notion
of contract as coordination specification and relate this to coordination by relationships and
coordination by transactions. This leads to the two concepts of transaction contract and
relation contract. Again, these are ideal types that occur in reality only in mixed forms.
Section 4 then introduces the three coordination mechanisms based respectively on price,
management authority or shared norms, and characterizes these by three variables known
1An ideal type is a concept that describes one aspect of reality and ignores other aspects. This helps us
to understand underlying regularities that would otherwise not be visible.
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from transaction cost theory: Predictability, trust and switching cost.
Section 5 discusses IT support that can be given to these three basic coordination mech-
anisms. IT also facilitates novel kinds of coordination, which are placed in a framework for
coordination mechanisms in section 6. In section 7 we discuss the approaches to require-
ments engineering for IT support of each of the three major coordination mechanisms. This
makes clear that RE approaches should be quite different. For example, if an RE approach
to hierarchical coordination were used for market support, it would miss important require-
ments, which is a recipe for failure. Section 8 winds up the report with a summary and an
indication of further work.
1.4 Terminology
In this report we use the following terminology.
• A commodity is a product of which all properties relevant for the consumer can be
completely described and which, once described, can be produced in large quantities.
A consumer can choose between commodities based upon a description of them and
their price.
• Coordination is the execution, monitoring and (re)planning of dependent actions by
different actors.2
• The term product will be used in this report to indicate material goods or immaterial
services.
• A norm is a standard against which entities or activities are measured. For example,
Webster’s defines a norm as a principle of right action binding upon the members of
a group and serving to guide, control or regulate proper and acceptable behavior [23].
Other examples of norms are the standard meter in the MKS system and the norm
set by management for this week’s production.
• A value is a utility. A phenomenon is of no value if no demand for it exists, and
it is of negative value if there is demand for it not to exist. The value of a product
determines its price to a certain extent but not completely. Prices only exist with
reference to exchanges, but from the moment we want a thing we value it, and once
we possess it, it can still have value for us [32, page 281].
2 Transactional and Relational Coordination
The basic coordination mechanisms of transactions and relationships have been analyzed in
the 1970s by Macneil [19, 20] in an analysis of legal contracts. The idea is simple: A contract
is an agreement between actors to coordinate their activities. So to classify contracts, one
must classify coordination mechanisms. Macneil found two basic coordination mechanisms,
namely coordination by transactions and coordination by relationships. We will define these
mechanisms next and then summarize their properties.
2This is more specific than Malone’s defintion of coordination as the management of dependencies be-
tween activities [21].
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There are many different kinds of transaction, ranging from anonymous transactions on
a spot market or stock exchange market, to informal exchanges between friends or members
of a family. To emphasize that we are defining an ideal type, that only occurs in reality
as part of a more complex coordination, we define the concept of a discrete transaction. A
discrete transaction is an exchange of products and money between actors that have no
relationship to each other whatsoever and that is separate from any other relationships to
others that the actors currently have. Having no relationship to each other here means that
the actors do not have a relationship now, did not have one in the past and will not have
one in the future. Transactions on a sport market and on the stock exchange are usually
discrete.
The concept of a discrete transaction is defined using the more primitive concept of
relationships between people. A discrete transaction is an exchange between actors that
do not have a relationship other than engaging in the transaction. We will not define this
more primitive concept of a relationship except by giving examples. Example relationships
are kinship relations, the relationship between friends, between husband and wife and be-
tween parents and children, between colleagues at work, between employee and employer,
between participants in a game, between members of a professional community, between
long-standing business partners, etc. Note that a relationship connects people. In a deriva-
tive sense, relationships can also connect businesses, because businesses consist of people
that can have a relationship. This is different from discrete transactions. A discrete trans-
action can be performed by business partners or even by software actors; relationships as
intended here can only exist between people.
Within all possible relationships between people we single out primary relationships as
a special ones. A primary relationship is a relation between people in which each partic-
ipant is irreplaceable and participates as a whole. Because the participant is irreplaceable,
the relationship cannot be transferred to other persons; because the person participates as
a whole, there is no limit to the aspects of life that the relationship can cover. A primary
relationship constitutes part of the identity of the participants. Examples of primary rela-
tionships are those between parents and children, between husband and wife, and between
close friends. Examples of non-primary relationships are those between employer and em-
ployee, between business partners, and between members of a profession. In non-primary
relationships, participants can be replaced; the relationship can be transferred to other per-
sons (e.g. by delegation); and the relationship covers only a limited part of the life of each
participant. Non-primary relationships are not part of the identity of any participant.
The primary relationship is an ideal type that only occurs in reality only in a diluted
form. Even parents and children do not talk about every conceivable topic, thereby vi-
olating the wholeness property of primary relationships; and even business partners may
develop a close friendship, thereby violating the replaceability characteristic of non-primary
relationships.
Primary relationships and discrete transactions can be contrasted as shown in figure 1.
In a discrete transaction, participants are essentially anonymous. If any actor knows the
identity of any other actor, then this is coincidental and not important for the transaction.
Participants can be replaced without changing the identity of the transaction. The identity
of participants in a relation, by contrast, is important. Participation in the relationship
defines part of their identity, and conversely replacing a participant changes the relationship.
Related to this, participants in a discrete transaction are a means to a purpose, namely
to perform an exchange of products against money. By contrast, participants in a pri-
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Discrete transaction Primary relationship
Identity of participants Unimportant Essential
Purpose To acquire products To continue the relation
Communication Concerns the exchange only About any topic
Figure 1: Primary relationships and discrete contrasts contrasted.
mary relationship are not a means to a purpose. They participate because of their unique
individual properties. One of the purposes of the relation is simply to continue the relation.
Because actors participate in a relationship as a unique whole, communication between
participants in a relation is wide-ranging. There is no aspect of the participants’ life that
cannot be discussed in a primary relationship. Communication between participants in a
discrete transaction, on the other hand, is purely functional. It concerns the exchange only.
To repeat the point once more, the concepts of discrete transaction and primary rela-
tionship are ideal types that occur in various mixtures in reality. For example, even when
buying oil on a spot market, there is a shared language in which oil is described, there is
mutually accepted money, a shared system of property rights in which each party accepts
the transfer of property in the transaction, a shared classification system of types of oil, etc.
In other words, the participants must participate in a relational community of shared norms
in order to perform the discrete transaction. However, they do not need to have a primary
relationship to perform the discrete transaction. Conversely, even in primary relationships,
transactions occur. Parents may count the number of times their children do the dishes
and even close friends may keep track of the number of visits to each other’s homes. To the
extent that this happens, shared activities are treated like monetary exchanges.
The ideal types of discrete transaction and primary relationships are useful to understand
coordination mechanisms. Before we turn to that, we list a number of additional properties
to highlight the differences between coordination by discrete transactions and by primary
relationships.
The following differences between discrete transactions and primary relationships have
consequences for IT support.
• Duration. Discrete transactions are performed quickly. Contact during the transac-
tion is short. By contrast, primary relations need time to prepare and once they exist,
they usually exist for a long time. Thus, any relationship has a history and a possible
future. Activities coordinated in a relationship have a tradition, consisting of shared
values and norms, and they are often coordinated in agreement with this tradition.
• Start and finish. A discrete transaction has a crisp start and a crisp finish. It
starts by clear agreement and finishes by clear performance. Relations start gradu-
ally, because people need time to get to know each other, and they end gradually,
because they also need time to alienate from each other. To participate in a relational
community, people have to learn the tradition, the shared values and norms of this
community.
• Cardinality. Discrete transactions preferably involve two participants. Inclusion of
a third could introduce relational aspects that would destroy the discreteness of the
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transaction. Primary relationships usually have many participants. These all share
the tradition associated with the tradition.
• Existence and identity. A discrete transaction exists as long as actors participate
in it, and ceases to exist when actors do not participate anymore. The identity of the
transaction is determined by the exchange that takes place. A relation, by contrast,
may exist among a number of actors before a particular actor starts participating in
it and it may continue to exist among the remaining actors when an actor exited from
it. Its identity at any point in time is determined by the participants in it, but this
may evolve slowly in time. The relationship defines a culture that may accept new
members but that maintains its identity independently from any particular member.
We can immediately draw some conclusions for IT support. IT support for discrete trans-
actions needs to provide an atomicity guarantee and a possibility to clearly demarcate the
start and finish of a transaction. Communication partners may be anonymous; they may
even desire anonymity; and they may act on behalf of others. By contrast, IT support for
relationships needs to provide a permanent communication infrastructure through which
groups can communicate. People must be able to join and leave these groups while the
communication network continues to exist. The community defined by the relationships
must announce the identity of each participant to other participants and anonymity is not
an option.
3 Coordination specification
3.1 Planning
Discrete transactions and primary relations have contrasting properties with regard to plan-
ning and specification. This is important for coordination support, because to support
coordination, the coordination must be specified explicitly.
• Specifyability. A discrete transaction can be specified in advance completely. The
specification describes what is exchanged when, and under what conditions, and what
the value of the exchanged products is. It also specifies what must happen when
something goes wrong. For each possible exception, a handling procedure is defined
in advance. By contrast, in a primary relationship, none of the activities that partic-
ipants will perform are specified in advance. In many cases, participants themselves
may only be able to describe what happened after the fact, not beforehand; and in
many cases the activities were so complex or chaotic that there is no agreement among
participants about what happened; and neither may there be a need to agree about
it.
• Predictability. Discrete transactions are planned beforehand and then executed as
planned. All contingencies must be specified beforehand, as well as all responses to
these contingencies. The exchange is predictable, precisely because the transaction
itself is inflexible; or, more precisely, all flexibility can be foreseen and is specified
in advance. Any planning for flexibility must take place before the transaction takes
place and this planning activity is not part of the transaction itself. Relations, by
contrast, are flexible. They are too complex to plan completely before they start.
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Planning takes place as part of the relation and often is performed jointly, by several
partners in the relation.
• Performance ambiguity. What is exchanged in a discrete transaction is commodi-
fied. This means that its properties are known in advance and can measured, and its
value is known. Performance ambiguity is low: It should be clear to all partners who
did and who did not deliver what was promised. In a primary relation, by contrast,
no explicit exchanges take place. Partners engage in shared activities that may or
may not not be planned in advance and that are not intended to distribute a mea-
sured and specified mount of value to the participants. It is very ambiguous, if not
meaningless, to try to determine afterwards who contributed what value to results
that are produced. It is a typical property of group work that attributing results to
individuals is not possible and often undesirable because it violates group spirit.
• Benefits. A discrete transaction is a reciprocal shifting of valued products that is
intended to be beneficial for both actors. Relations, on the other hand, are value-
creating activities in which all participants share the burdens and benefits. Benefits
partly return to the party that helped creating the benefit.
• Conflict-resolution. When trouble occurs in a discrete transaction, the transaction
is rolled back and if that is not possible, damages are claimed according to proce-
dures specified in advance in a contract. In a primary relation, trouble is expected
as normal aspect of life and when it occurs, partners solve the problem together.
The purpose remains to continue the relation rather than to terminate it and claim
damages. Claiming damages would signify the end of the relation.
These differences all concern the way activities are coordinated: By planning in advance or
by joint problem-solving when the need arises. A discrete transaction is a coordinated set
of activities in which an exchange takes place. The exchange is specified in advance and
executed as specified. The specification includes the expected performance of all partners
as well as the ways in which non-performance can take place, plus the expected responses
to non-performance. The basic coordination mechanism is price: Each participant in a
discrete transaction puts a value on the exchange and is willing to exchange something
for this value. In a market of purely discrete transactions, the exchanged commodities are
completely described and their price is the only remaining characteristic that actors need
to know in order to select the discrete transaction they want to engage in.
Primary relationships provide a context for the coordination of activities that are not
specified in advance but for which shared norms and values exist. When kinship members,
friends, or members of a profession need to coordinate their activities, there is a tradition of
cultural norms, shared experience, shared values and shared goals that allows participants to
coordinate their activities without explicit specification in advance. When the need arises,
specifications of joint behavior may be produced that are grossly incomplete because they
supplement implicit agreement about what should be done anyway. The basic coordination
mechanism is a collection of shared norms: Each participant trusts each other participant
to share these same norms and this allows them to coordinate their activities according to
these norms. Participants trust other participants whose identity they know, and whom
they know to participate in the relational community in which these norms are shared.
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3.2 Contracts
A contract is an agreement between two or more actors to coordinate their activities [19].
Contracts may be specified in a written text, or they may be made orally without any
written proof. Contracts may be legally binding or legally void. And a contract may
contain or imply agreements that none of the partners may be aware of. For example, law
or tradition may prescribe certain elements of the agreement that were unknown to the
contracting partners at the time they struck the contract, but that are binding anyway.
Corresponding to the two basic coordination mechanisms there are two contracts, that
we will call discrete and relational. A discrete contract is a specification of a set of
coordinated activities among partners in which products and money are exchanged in a
discrete transaction. Because a discrete contract describes a discrete transaction, it has the
following properties.
• A discrete contract treats as irrelevant the identity of the parties to the transaction.
• It commodifies as much as possible the exchanged good or service.
• It limits as much as possible the sources to be considered in determining the activities
that are to take place. As far as possible, these are all specified in the contract. In
discrete contracts, possible secondary sources, such as an umbrella contract, the law
or standards, are avoided.
• But if secondary sources are to be considered when determining what activities have
been agreed to take place, there is a priority order among them. The order, from high
to low, is this:
– Written specifications;
– Orally communicated specifications;
– Information communicated nonlinguistically (e.g. by behavior);
– Communicated circumstances when agreement was struck (e.g. time and place
of agreement);
– Noncommunicated circumstances when agreement was struck (e.g. tradition).
• The content and consequences of the transaction are treated as atomic.3 This means
that all promised consequences of the transaction are treated as if they were present
at the start of the transaction. So the transaction is treated as an atomic activity in
which all its effects are present immediately.
• A discrete contract assumes that at all parties to an exchange start the exchange with
full consent as specified in the initial contract. All parties are assumed to be aware of
all consequences of the contract and to agree to this.
A primary relational contract is a specification of a relational context for performing
future activities. Just as any other contract, a primary relational contract may be written or
oral, it may be legal or illegal and it may contain elements not thought of by the contracting
partners. A primary relational contract is somewhat like the hypothetical social contract of
3Macneil uses the term presentiation.
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the 18th century philosophers. As a specification of future activities, a primary relational
contract is grossly incomplete because it describes a shared background for coordinating
activities without specifying the coordination itself. The features of primary relational
contracts mirror those of discrete contracts, and they follow from the properties of primary
relationships.
• A primary relational contract identifies the partners of the relational community being
defined.
• It does not specify any particular exchanges between the partners. Exchanges may
very well take place, but they are not specified in a primary relational contract.
• The contract allows secondary sources outside the contract specification to determine
what is actually to be done.
• The priority order of sources to be considered when determining what activities have
been agreed to take place, is the reverse of that for discrete contracts:
– Noncommunicated circumstances when agreement was struck (e.g. tradition);
– Communicated circumstances when agreement was struck (e.g. time and place
of agreement);
– Information communicated nonlinguistically (e.g. by behavior);
– Orally communicated specifications;
– Written specifications.
• It is unknown which activities are going to be coordinated. It does not make sense to
indicate particular results that must be produced by the primary relationship.
• The contract expresses agreement with a set of shared norms and values, without
expressing willingness to engage in any particular joint action whatsoever.
In relational coordination, written contracts are the least important source to find out what
activities should take place. Oral agreements have precedence, and the traditional way of
doing things has highest precedence.
Discrete contracts and primary relational contracts are again ideal types. Rarely is a
contract a fully complete specification of coordinated activities. And rarely is a contract
merely a specification of an intention to cooperate under a certain tradition of coopera-
tion. Actual contracts specify some activities to be coordinated, and also presuppose some
relational community within they will take place. However, some contracts, such as spot
market contracts, are clearly at the discrete end of the spectrum and other contracts, such
as marriage contracts, are clearly at the relational end. In all cases, the contract is a de-
scription of the type of coordination activity that is to take place. And in actual cases, the
priority order of sources to determine what should actually happen is not so clear cut as
suggested by the two listings given above.
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4 Coordination Mechanisms
4.1 Markets, communities and hierarchies
A market is an infrastructure for coordination by price, and a community is an infrastruc-
ture for coordination by shared norms. All actual coordination mechanisms combine these
two. Of all possible coordination mechanisms, management hierarchy has received a lot of
attention and we will treat this as third coordination mechanism. It will become apparent
later that there are many other kinds of coordination mechanisms.
• In a market, coordination takes place in discrete transactions. In each transaction,
products (goods or services) and money are exchanged. Because the description of a
commodity is known to the user, the remaining item of information used for coordi-
nation (trading) is price, which for commodities gives information about the scarcity
of the product [30]. Examples of markets are spot markets, the stock exchange, auc-
tions, supermarkets, grocery stores, malls, weekly open air markets, and your local
hardware shop. Some of these, such as spot markets and auctions, are discrete mar-
kets because all transactions occurring in them are discrete. Most other markets have
some relational aspect. For example, you do business with your local hardware shop
based on mutual trust. If the business owner knows you personally, and knows you
share some norms that govern your and his activities, then you may return goods that
you do not need and you may postpone payment to a later time.
• In a community, activities are coordinated relationally, i.e. based on shared norms.
The coordinated activities are a shared burden but also benefits produced jointly
are shared without being allocated in a measured way to participants. Examples of
communities are kinship networks, ethnic networks, professional networks, “old boys”
networks, regional economies, and even criminal networks. Some of these, such as
kinship networks and ethnic networks, are primary, but most are nonprimary because
they contain transactional elements. For example in regional economies, people do
business with each other based on trust but in the long run, there is expected to be
a measured reciprocity in exchanges.
• In a hierarchy, activities are coordinated by management. There is an asymmetrical
relationship in which some actors, called employees, have agreed to obey management
oversight by another actor, called their employer, but they agreed this against a price:
their salary. Employees have an incomplete long-term relational contract with their
employer that states the general content of their work and indicates a shared goal, but
does not specify in detail all activities to be performed. Activities are coordinated on
a day-to-day basis by management. There is an asymmetric relationship in which the
employee reports to his or her manager and the manager is accountable for the employ-
ees reporting to him or her [14]. This accountability relationship is absent in markets
and it is diffused in communities. Examples of hierarchies are businesses, schools
and government institutions. Hierarchies have community and market properties to
varying degrees. For example, in a film production company, hardly any activity can
be specified in advance in detail, as is usual in communities, but in other hierarchies,
such as job shops, most activities can be specified in advance, as is characteristic of
discrete transactions.
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The importance of hierarchies was first pointed out by Coase [5], who showed that to
produce a product, we must choose a position between two extremes. One extreme is a
market, where to produce a product, an actor will contract with other actors to perform
the required activities. This reduces production costs for the actor to zero, because all
production is performed by others and the actor merely coordinates these activities using
contracts. But transaction costs will accordingly be very high.
The other extreme is to create a network of non-primary relationships called a business
and introduce a management hierarchy to coordinate activities in the business. Coordi-
nation by management differs from coordination by shared norms because it is centralized
and is done by communicated instructions rather than by implicit norms. In the extreme
case, the business integrates all required labor and capital in its own hierarchy, so that all
production activities are performed in-house. This reduces transaction costs to zero but
production costs will be very high.
Assuming economic rationality, actors will choose a point between these two extremes.
Some activities will be outsourced, reducing production costs and increasing transaction
costs. Other activities will be performed in-house, increasing production costs and reducing
transaction costs. Under the assumption of economic rationality, the position chosen will
be one in which the sum
production cost + transaction cost
is low. We will say that the efficiency of a coordination mechanism is high when this sum
is low.
4.2 Predictability, trust and switching cost
We now have identified three coordination mechanisms, namely coordination by price, co-
ordination by shared norms, and coordination by management, and identified three infras-
tructures for this: markets, communities and hierarchies. Transaction cost economy [37, 38]
and economic sociology [27, 29] provide concepts to understand the choice between these
three coordination mechanisms. The three operative variables are predictability, mutual
trust and switching cost.
• Predictability is our ability to describe the future. Predictability is a function of our
cognitive limitations and the complexity of future events. In a discrete market, trans-
actions can be completely described and so actors can conclude complete contracts.
And once a transaction is contracted for, they can be certain about what will happen
in a transaction. If predictability of future activities is high, performance ambiguity
of these activities is low and vice versa.
• Trust is accepted vulnerability to an actor’s possible but not expected ill will [2].
Mutual trust is high in communities, because actors depend upon unspecified activities
performed by others. Trust disappears in the face of opportunism, which is self-interest
seeking with guile [38]. Opportunists choose to perform activities in their own interest
even if they promised to do otherwise, they intentionally present information they
don’t believe is true, or intentionally withhold information that is relevant for partners
in the exchange.
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Markets Hierarchies Communities
Coordination mechanism Price Management Shared norms
Predictability High Low Lower
Performance ambiguity Low High Higher
Mutual trust Low High Higher
Opportunism High Low Lower
Switching cost Low High Higher
Asset specificity Low High Higher
Figure 2: Differences between markets, hierarchies and communities.
• Switching cost is the cost of replacing an actor in a cooperation by another actor.
It is directly related to asset specificity, which is the specialization of assets with
respect to its uses. For example, interactions with a particular actor may require
specialized equipment, or require transaction-specific knowledge from employees, or
may require assets to be located at one geographical place. Asset specificity, and
therefore switching cost, is low in discrete markets, because discrete transactions can
be performed with any actor at all that offers the required products. In relational
communities it is high, because relationships involve a a build-up of relation-specific
knowledge and may involve specialized equipment dedicated to particular partners in
particular locations.
Note that predictability is a cognitive factor that is essential for discrete markets because
without predictability there cannot be discrete contracts. Trust is a moral factor that is
essential for communities because without trust there cannot be coordination based on
incompletely specified activities. Asset specificity, and thus switching cost, is an economic
factor that concerns the investment by an actor in specialized assets. Figure 2 summarizes
the values of these variables for the three coordination infrastructures.
If transactions can be specified completely, then they can be specified in discrete con-
tracts and we can coordinate exchanges in a market by means of price. However, if they
cannot be predicted at all, coordination by shared norms is an option. Shared norms can
substitute for completely specified actions. This means that switching costs are high be-
cause there will be a significant investment in personal relationships and specialized assets
dedicated to particular relationships. This is efficient as long as mutual trust is high, be-
cause otherwise opportunistic partners may switch to other partners if they perceive this
to be in their self-interest.
If mutual trust is low but asset specificity is high, then a business can reduce risk by
incorporating potentially opportunistic partners. In other words, it will buy these partners
and integrate them as business units into its own hierarchy, making switching impossible
for them. This will improve efficiency and replace coordination by price with coordination
by management. The same holds for market transactions that require asset specificity: the
risk of opportunism can then be reduced by incorporating business partners within one
hierarchy. In both cases, a situation of low trust is replaced by one of higher trust.
There are detailed economic analyses of the mechanisms why economically rational ac-
tors choose one of these coordination mechanisms [4, 37, 38]. It is not the purpose of this
report to rehearse this. We will use the characterization of coordination mechanisms given
so far to identify IT support for these mechanisms in the next section. This will lead, in the
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section after that, to an identification of refinements of our classification of coordination
infrastructures.
5 IT support
5.1 IT support for coordination in markets
IT support for markets must provide functionality for coordination by price in a context
where transaction partners initially do not know each other, and may never get to know each
other. Transactions are completely specified in advance, and performance can be monitored
and evaluated quantitatively. This leads to the following list of IT support functions for
coordination by price [1, 3, 15].
• Matching buyers and sellers.
– Advertising a product.
– Searching for a product.
– Aggregating product supply or demand
– Gathering product information.
– Negotiating a price.
– Specifying a contract.
• Transaction execution.
– Supporting logistics.
– Supporting or performing payments.
– Replacing trust, e.g. authentication or credit rating.
– Executing a contract (if the contract is executable by computer)
– Monitoring transaction execution.
– Evaluating the monitored execution against the contract.
Each of these functions follows from the requirements that anonymous actors coordinate
by performing transactions on a discrete market. To be able to do that, actors must know
what is being asked and offered, they must match and negotiate a price, they must specify
the results of this in a contract and then execute the transaction as contracted. Because
partners may be anonymous, execution must be monitored and evaluated.
Examples of infrastructures providing some of the the above support functions are e-
markets, e-auctions, e-malls, and web shops. Some actors specialize in providing generic
services that can be used in all these infrastructures, such as payment or authentication.
As explained earlier, we will view all of these infrastructures as markets in which activities
are coordinated by price. One precondition for any of this to be efficient is the presence of
a standardized infrastructure for e-markets. Without standardization, we would not have a
market but a hierarchy with a local, business-internal “standard”; or a community with a a
multitude of local habits and relation-specific ways of doing business. Either way, switching
costs would be high. The hallmark of e-markets is that switching costs are low.
15
5.2 IT support for coordination in communities
Coordination by shared norms requires a totally different infrastructure. Actors coordinate
in an ad hoc manner when the need arises, and then may not specify in advance what they
are going to do. They are aware of each other’s identity all the time and know what the
capabilities of each actor are, and share norms of cooperation that may not all be explicitly
specified. Each actor evaluates activities by these shared norms. Examples of IT support
for this way of coordination are chatboxes, meeting rooms, email, shared workspaces, col-
laborative authoring tools, conference paper reviewing systems, videoconferencing systems,
etc. Each of these systems supports one particular type of collaborative activity, such as
sending email, chatting, changing a document in a shared workspace, reviewing a conference
paper, etc. This leads to the following list of functions to be provided by an infrastructure
for coordination by shared norms.
• Establishing a shared context.
– Identifying an actor to the group.
– Creating groups.
– Establishing shared norms for a group. These are not all shared norms, and they
may evolve, but they do determine a group identity.
– Allowing an actor to leave a group.
– Phasing out a group.
• Coordinating activities.
– Signaling occasions that require coordinated actions.
– Signaling that an activity took place, so that actors may decide to coordinate
their own activities with it.
– Performing joint activities.
– Establishing a shared view of the activities to be coordinated and of their results.
– Maintaining a log of joint activities.
All of this functionality presupposes that there is a group of people that act in the awareness
that they are a group. This in turn presupposes mutual trust, relation-specific assets and
all other community aspects mentioned earlier. The functions listed above then support
coordination activities performed in this group awareness.
5.3 IT support for coordination in hierarchies
Turning to coordination by management, we find the traditional information system func-
tions described eloquently by Galbraith [8]. In a hierarchy that operates in a totally pre-
dictable environment, all processes can be specified in advance and workers coordinate
their activities according to fixed process descriptions. When unpredictability increases,
the number of exceptions to be referred to management increases and some coordination
mechanism other than process specification must be sought. One of these mechanisms is
the creation of communities of actors that coordinate their activities in an ad hoc manner,
as described above. Another mechanism is the introduction of information systems that
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allow actors lower in the hierarchy to make decisions themselves, thus reducing the number
of decisions to be made by higher management; or by introducing information systems that
bring information directly to the point of decision-making, speeding up the decision-making
process in the face of exceptions.
In the 1980s, an additional infrastructure to improve coordination within a hierarchy
arose, namely workflow management technology. Using workflow management systems,
managers can specify more complex processes and can monitor the progress of cases, em-
ployees can coordinate their tasks more efficiently, and workloads can be managed more
efficiently. The IT support functionality required in hierarchies is accordingly the following:
• Data management support. This includes operational information systems that
collect, store and distribute operational data, as well as of management information
systems such as data warehouses.
• Process management support. This includes workflow management, case han-
dling and document management.
Note that here we have the traditional view of information systems as support for coordi-
nation by management in hierarchies [7].
5.4 The impact of IT on coordination
The Internet provides us with two features not previously present in IT support, namely
relatively cheap monitoring capability and a relatively cheap standardized communication
infrastructure. As explained in the next few paragraphs, this makes new coordination
mechanism possible.
Maladaptation. One of the costs of coordinating by price is that a partner may not
perform as promised, or that a contract we struck turns out not to be as profitable for us
as expected [38]. This causes a cost whichever way we turn:
• Continuing the agreement as it is currently performed is costly.
• However, haggling out a solution is costly too. It uses resources that we could have
spent in a more efficient way.
• If haggling does not yield a satisfactory answer then we must either take out loss or
invoke an arbiter, which comes with a cost too.
• To back up our actions in case of maladaptation, we need a governance system con-
sisting of regulators, a legal force and arbiters. Running such a governance system is
costly too.
The sum of all these costs are called maladaptation costs by Williamson. We cannot avoid
all of these maladaptation costs but we can reduce some of them by monitoring. Current
communication technology allows us to monitor a partner during execution of an agreement,
which reduces the risk of malperformance in the first place. We can also ask a third party
to monitor both and we can collect performance data, which allows us to select reliable
partners in the long run. All of this makes the market more efficient.
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Outsourcing. Improved monitoring capability also reduces the risk of outsourcing activi-
ties to a small number of partners. Outsourcing can be efficient because the organizations to
which activities are outsourced, can use economies of scale and of specialization to achieve
greater efficiency. In addition, outsourcing to a smaller number of long-term partners allows
increased product complexity, without increasing search cost. However, this requires a long-
term investment in relation-specific assets and this in turn creates the risk of opportunistic
behavior of long-term partners, who may leak information to competitors or who may not
produce the best possible product because they are assured of a customer anyway. Tradi-
tionally, these were reasons for a business to integrate these long-term partners as business
units in its own hierarchy. Improved monitoring reduces these risks and takes away the
need for hierarchical integration [4].
The fundamental transformation. An actor may lose bargaining power simply by
executing a transaction. For example, a supplier may have made large investments to
do business with a particular customer, and if these investments are not usable for other
customers, the supplier is stuck to this customer and has lost bargaining power. Or a
business may have built up detailed knowledge of a partner, that can be only acquired
by years of interaction, making it costly to switch to another partner that does not have
this knowledge. Simply by doing business, a situation of large numbers, in which an actor
can negotiate with a large number of other actors that are more or less interchangeable, is
effectively reduced to a situation of small numbers, in which bargaining is nearly impossible.
Williamson [38, page 61] calls this the fundamental transformation.
The classical answer to this risk to vertically integrate with the partner, preventing this
partner to switch to other customers. This replaces the cost of transactions by the cost of
hierarchy. Standardization is however another way to avoid this risk, without resorting to
hierarchical integration. The more interactions with business partners are based upon stan-
dard hardware and software, the more interchangeable these partners remain and the less a
situation of large numbers is transformed into a situation of small numbers. Determination
of de facto standards is one of the major rules of the information economy [31].
6 A Inventory of Coordination Mechanisms
Reduced transaction costs, increased communication speed and connectivity, risk reduc-
tion by monitoring and standardization all facilitate the rise of new forms of organization
networks. In figure 3 we extend our simple three-way classification of coordination mech-
anisms by including a number of novel coordination forms that have been facilitate or at
least stimulated by IT.
Figure 3 contains the three coordination infrastructures identified so far, namely hierar-
chies, markets and communities. For each of these, there are many variants, one of which
has been listed in the table.
The simplest variation is that between external markets, which are discrete markets
of actors that are not hierarchically related, and internal markets, which are markets
within a hierarchy. An example is the Swedish firm ABB, in which business units trade
products against market prices [24]. Because these business units are part of one hierarchy,
mutual trust is higher than in external markets. Business units can also do business with
external partners.
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Generalized hierarchy Generalized market Generalized community
Coordination
mechanism
Hierarchy
Star net-
work
External
market
Internal
market
Value net-
work
Group
Management
authority
X X
Price X X
Shared
norms
X X
Switching
cost
high low low high high
Trust high high low high high
Specifyability
of activities
high high low
Figure 3: A framework for coordination support. The columns indicate coordination infrastruc-
tures, the rows indicate coordination mechanisms. A cross in a cell of the upper three rows
means that this is the dominant coordination mechanism for that infrastructure. An empty cell
in the lower three rows means that this variable can have any value for this infrastructure.
A more complicated variation is the star network, which is a community of actors
managed by a central authority. This is a community because it is a relational structure,
but coordinated by a hierarchical management structure. Here are some examples.
• Networks of professional companies may be organized by a central coordinator on a
project basis. For example, in the construction industry, a central construction firm
coordinates many subcontractors in a building project. In the publishing industry, a
publishing house coordinates a large number of authors, agents and editors. In the
film and recording industry, companies do the same with artists, directors, camera
persons, etc. [29]. These communities consist of independent companies that have
other activities besides contributing to this community, but they are managed by a
central company, at least for the duration of the project. Participants in the star net-
work are valued because of their professional abilities. However, usually actors are not
so unique that cannot be replaced by another—a market-like property. On the other
hand, mutual trust is high—a community property. The activities to be performed
may be fully standardized, which would help to reduce switching cost, but in many
cases the project is too chaotic for that and coordination is not done by contract but
by on-the-spot negotiation. Oversight is maintained by central management, which
makes it a hierarchy.
• Donnelley and Sons is a communication services company that manages educational
book production on behalf of publishers. For complex projects they ask for bids from
graphics companies on behalf of their customer and do this for many projects for
many customers in parallel. This is done using a web-based IT infrastructure that
keeps tracks of projects, customers, bids, negotiations, deadlines and agreements [34].
This is an example of an IT-facilitated star network in the publishing industry.
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• IKEA has mobilized suppliers world-wide to produce components for the furniture
that it designs and sells [26]. The furniture is transported and assembled by its cus-
tomers. IKEA offers to assist its customers in doing so but this too is outsourced
to independent companies and customers have the choice performing these activi-
ties themselves. IKEA also helps its suppliers to bring their production process to
high standards, by means of technical assistance, leased equipment, and advice. It
will also help them find raw materials and introduce them to new business partners,
which will bring financial health to the supplier and ensures a steady high quality
influx of component from the supplier. IKEA coordinates this network through an
IT infrastructure in which each cash register in any of its stores updates warehouse
information system as well as operational headquarters in Sweden in real time. This
star network is based on mutual trust, but any shared norms for processes and prod-
ucts are installed by IKEA as in any management hierarchy. Products are precisely
specified and processes are specified in advance. Switching costs for IKEA would be
high due to investments in suppliers, but this is balanced by mutual trust and the
creation of a win-win situation for all actors in the network.
• Nike designs and markets sports shoes and coordinates a large number of suppliers in
the Far East that produce these shoes according to specification [24]. These suppliers
also work for other designers so that their technical competence is enhanced. This
reduces switching costs for all parties concerned. Cooperation is on a permanent basis
but Nike will not hesitate to switch to another supplier when this is cheaper–which is
a market property. Mutual trust is high, a property of communities and hierarchies,
and specifyability of activities is very high—a market property.
• Dell and Cisco outsource production activities to others and have implemented low
transaction costs for their customers and low switching costs with respect to their
suppliers. If they find a cheaper supplier, they will select it [33]. They are virtual
organizations, which is a limiting case of a star network. A virtual organization is
an organization that specified its business processes independently from any resources
that perform these processes, and dynamically switches to other resources when this
is more efficient [25]. In the extreme case, we are back to the single actor in a discrete
market, that delegates all production activities to others and who creates value by
coordinating the work of others. It is not the same as a market, because a resource
has relationship to the virtual organization, at least till the end of the process for
which it is contracted.
Some of these communities exist without using IT but most of them could only exist using an
IT infrastructure. They take advantage of reduced transaction costs, increased monitoring
capacity, and standardization. Typical functionalities are collaboration support, negotiation
support, and tracking of interactions. These functionalities are absent from the traditional
IT support for hierarchies listed earlier in section 5.3. Requirements engineering for such
infrastructures should take the characteristics of the coordination mechanism into account.
Moving to the right-hand side of our framework, we encounter groups, which are rela-
tional communities as defined earlier in this report. We call them groups here to emphasize
that they are communities of people, not of businesses or software. Here are some examples.
• Kinship networks coordinating a family meeting;
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• Geographically distributed programmers working on a GNU software product;
• Engineers in one or more companies collaboratively working out a new product design;
• Professionals in competing companies discussing technical topics of mutual interest;
• Scientists organizing a conference;
• Insurance experts in a large company discussing hard cases;
In all these cases, activities are roughly known in advance but not specifyable in detail.
Coordination is by shared norms determined by tradition, the profession, shared education,
etc. Members of the group trust each other and people who participate do this as unique
individuals. Because each participant contributes to the community, the value of participa-
tion grows the more people participate in the community. Community connectivity is high:
Each member is connected to each other member.
In an institutional variant, it is organizations who form a community. A value network
is a set of companies that jointly responds to a need that none of them can solve on its own,
Coordination is however not done by management hierarchy but by local adjustments and
negotiations. Here are some examples.
• In the South of Germany, small and medium-size firms with a specialty in some aspect
of textile manufacturing cooperate to produce textiles. The network includes small
craft industry as well as research institutes, vocational training centers, consulting
firms, and marketing agencies [29]. The more specialized a firm is in this network,
the more it depends for its success upon the success of other firms. Key technologies
are developed in a collaborative manner. The network is structured to strengthen
the social structure in which textile firms are embedded and to encourage cooperative
relationships that attenuate the destructive aspects of competition. There is no central
management hierarchy such as in star networks. Coordination is done by shared
norms. Switching costs are high but this is offset by mutual trust.
• Fraud control in the Netherlands involves hundreds of organizations, including the
national police force, regional police forces, the auditing department of the ministry
of economic affairs, the auditing department of the ministry of agricultural affairs,
the tax department, the fiscal intelligence service, the social service, and many others.
When a suspected case of fraud is investigated, it is unpredictable which of these or-
ganizations will be involved, information is difficult to get and in general activities are
unstructured. To facilitate investigations, an interorganizational information system
has been implemented containing indexes to information present in these different or-
ganizations [10]. There is no central authority in all these organizations and products
as well as procedures are often ill-defined and changeable. Organizations collaborate
by an extensive system of ad hoc agreements and informal evaluations. Switching
costs are high—each actor in the network is unique. Each actor depends upon others
for its success, but at the same time each actor tends to optimize its decisions with
respect to its own goal rather than with respect to an overall network goal.
• The port of Rotterdam contains a network that connects transporters, ship owners,
ship brokers, stevedores, insurance companies, the customs department and many
other parties that all work together to respond to a shipping request by shipping the
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goods to the desired destination. Intermediate products and communication processes
are well-defined. It is not predictable in advance for each case what activities will be
performed, and there is no central management hierarchy. Nevertheless, it is in the
interest of each actor to participate in the network. This is an example of a value
chain, which is a network of companies coordinated by mutual agreements, in which
processes and products are well defined from customer demand to customer response.
A value chain may be a simple pipeline, but it may in general have any topology of
cooperating actors. A crucial feature is that the process from demand to response is
well-defined.
In these communities, switching costs are high because each actor has its own individual
contribution. For each actor, it is not easy to find another actor that can provide the same
services. Mutual trust may be high or may be virtually absent. For example, organizations
in the legal value network may be fighting each other to defend their own right of existence
and their own budget, but at the same time they need each other to do their job. Deci-
sions are made according to the garbage can model in which problems, solutions, actors
and decision occasions meet at particular points in time governed by the social context,
social structure and the importance of decisions [6]. The outcome is at most boundedly
rational. To the extent that mutual interest is understood or there is some form of central
coordination, as in the port of Rotterdam, decisions are made in a more rational manner.
Specifyability of activities to be coordinated may be low or high. In regional economies,
activities may be subcontracted so they are specifyable. Informal social contacts in the
community will take care of the part not specified in advance. In other situations, such as
fraud investigations, specifyability of activities is extremely low and in others, such as in
the port of Rotterdam, it is very high.
These examples should make clear that there are many intermediate and mixed forms of
coordination in addition to those listed in figure 3. However, figure 3 does list a number of
mechanism and variables that can be used to understand any given coordination mechanism.
It can serve as a starting point for requirements engineering for IT support, discussed next.
7 Requirements Engineering for Coordination Support
Technology
In any given coordination mechanism, one will find a mixture of the basic mechanisms
discussed above. To analyze requirements for IT support of coordination, the analyst should
consider the different mechanisms as aspects of one situation and analyze each of these
aspects in isolation, combining the results later.
We view requirements engineering as the problem analysis task in a practical problem-
solving cycle, where problem-analysis is theory-building. A practical problem is a difference
between what we perceive a situation to be and what we would like it to be, and to analyze
a practical problem we must build a theory of the problem domain, which provides answers
to several questions.
• What are the phenomena of the problem domain? Which events occur, how often do
they occur, what entities are affected by the events?
• What are the regularities (“laws of nature”) according to which the domain evolves?
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These regularities must be used to motivate any solution that we come up with. A
solution is introduced in the problem domain because it is expected to cause a certain
effect; and this causation is backed up by regularities, i.e. by the laws of the problem
domain. If the problem domain is physical, then the regularities are the laws of
physics. If it is social, then the regularities include generalizations about the behavior
of people, business procedures, laws issued by governments, etc.
• What are the values that make the phenomena problematic? The value of a phe-
nomenon is its utility, expressed in quantitative or qualitative terms. Each problem
domain has a value system, which is a set of values that indicate what is good and
what is bad, what has a positive and what a negative utility [11]. To say that a phe-
nomenon is problematic is to say that according to the value system of the problem
domain, it has a negative value.
• Who are the stakeholders that have these values? This introduces the possibility that
different stakeholders have different values.
• What are the goals of these stakeholders with respect to the problem domain? Goals
are desired situations. Again, different stakeholders may have different goals.
• What are the obstacles that prevent the stakeholders to achieve these goals? Any
solution must do something about these obstacles.
• What are the constraints within which a solution must be achieved?
The answers to these questions guide the problem-solver to specify a solution, analyze it,
and evaluate the specified solution. In this report, product requirements are desired
solution properties specified by the problem-solver. Domain requirements on the other
hand are the goals of the stakeholders with respect to the problem domain. Requirements for
coordination support are thus desired properties of products that support coordination. But
these product requirements are motivated by domain requirements, which are the desired
coordination mechanisms to be realized in the domain.
The analysis in the following sections merely scratches the surface of a complex topic.
The analyses should be viewed as an indication of what can be done and as a programme
for further research.
7.1 Requirements engineering for supporting coordination by man-
agement
The problem domain is here a hierarchy within a single business or across businesses (a star
network). For each of the domain aspects, there are some generic questions to ask.
• Phenomena. This includes what people in the hierarchy actually do: Tasks performed,
services provided to customers, markets, customers, distribution channels, information
used and produced, the meaning that this information actually has, exceptions that
actually occur, they way people respond to this, volume of data handled and frequency
of events, etc. For a star network, this includes the actual network structure and the
phenomenology of communications between members of the network.
23
• Regularities. This includes centrally defined work procedures (that do not need to
coincide with what is actually done) and exception-handling rules, formal dictionaries
in use, formal agreements between members of a star network about communication
and logistics, communication standards in use, etc.
• Values. This includes the desires of stakeholders that makes the phenomena problem-
atic, and the priorities and urgency that makes it important to solve certain problems
before others.
• Stakeholders. This includes the business structure, relevant business units, report-
ing and accountability structure, etc. For star networks, it includes identifying the
business actors and their role in the network.
• Goals. In a hierarchy, this includes the business mission, business strategies, targets
defined by management to improve the situation, opportunities to be realized, etc. In
a star network, it includes the goals of all business actors
• Constraints. This includes the business strategy, constraints arising from law and
labor relations, etc.
Classical requirements engineering methods from ISAC [17, 18] to Information Engineer-
ing [22] approach information systems requirements through one or more of these aspects
of the problem situation. Requirements engineering for business process support usually
focuses on methods for process modeling [13, 28].
7.2 Requirements engineering for supporting coordination by price
Requirements engineering in this case is oriented toward finding out how products are
exchanged.
• Phenomena. These include processes for matching buyers and sellers and for executing
the transaction as they currently take place, volume and frequency of trade, etc.
• Regularities. These include regularities in consumer behavior found by marketing
people, trade procedures, legal requirements, etc.
• Values. This includes the distribution of costs and benefits deemed desirable by each
stakeholder. Different stakeholders may have a very different view of this.
• Stakeholders. This is a description of the business actors and the means of transport
and communication that connect them.
• Goals. These can be represented by a value model [9] that represents the flow of
monetary value in transactions in the desired situation.
• Constraints. This includes constraints arising from technology, constraints imposed
by law and international relations, etc.
Coordination by price may be combined with coordination by management in a star network
and with coordination by shared norms in a value chain. Nevertheless, to understand the
problem domain, the requirements engineer should try to understand these different aspects
separately before building an overall theory of the problem domain.
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7.3 Requirements engineering for supporting coordination by shared
norms
In this case we know that there are unstated shared norms that govern coordination. Prob-
lem analysis must identify these shared norms.
• Phenomena. This includes the activities to be coordinated, their frequency, actors
involved, etc. In a value chain, these activities can be described completely.
• Regularities. This includes shared norms that govern coordination. These may be
rules for behavior in particular circumstances, guidelines for performing an activity,
rules for involving certain actors in certain activities, and for involving them in a
certain precedence order, the semantic codes used to interpret the meaning activities,
etc. In a value chain, it includes a description of the business process performed by
the actors in the chain.
• Values. This includes the traditional values in this community, burdens and benefits
shared by group members, professional values etc. that make certain phenomena
problematic. In groups, there may be performance ambiguity, so it may be hard to
get an unambiguous description of the value system; the value system itself is likely
to be ambiguous.
• Stakeholders. This includes a map of all actors and the roles they play. In a value
chain, it includes a description of the actors that perform tasks in a chain and of their
role in the value-adding process.
• Goals. This includes goals shared by the group. If there is no consensus, it is important
to find out which actor supports which goal.
• Constraints. Norms and values imply constraints on possible solutions. Other sources
of constraints are the law and tradition.
Since in a group, activities cannot be specified in advance, and in all communities, goals
may not be clear but problems are, it is likely that support for coordination by shared
norms is implemented in an evolutionary manner.
8 Conclusions
In this report we analyzed three groups of coordination mechanisms for which IT sup-
port can be provided. These mechanisms mix transactional and relational coordination
to various degrees. IT support for these mechanisms facilitates the introduction of novel
coordination mechanisms. We defined a framework for coordination within which all these
mechanisms can be described and used this framework as a basis for requirements engi-
neering approaches. The three basic coordination mechanisms are three top-level problem
classes for which different IT solutions can be sought, and the three RE approaches are
ways to analyze these three domains.
In practice, the coordination mechanisms will occur in mixed forms, so that in practice,
we will have to combine the different RE approaches. However, we claim that the omission
of an approach where this coordination mechanism is present is a recipe for failure. If we
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would use a classical RE approach for management hierarchies to markets or communities,
we would miss important aspects of the problem domain, which would lead to inappropriate
IT support.
In future research, we will investigate case studies and perform action research to analyze
and further elaborate the requirements engineering approaches for supporting coordination
price-based and norm-based coordination.
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